Above all, a real-world U.S. strategy must recognize the need to allocate the resources that are
actually needed to meet U.S. security needs. The Ukraine War and the rise of China have shown
that both the U.S. and its partners cannot continue to take a “peace dividend” for a world that does
not actually exist. The U.S. spent some 7% to 9% of its GDP on national security during the peak
of the Cold War when it was dealing with one much smaller competitor – the former Soviet Union
(FSU). It now only plans to spend somewhere around 3% of GDP on security at a time when it
must compete with two major powers and at least two additional serious regional threats.
No strategy can survive the failure to honestly address the real-world cost of adequate security.
The U.S. cannot afford to advance a strategy without annual defense budget proposals that are
based on real-world plans for future spending. The U.S. must budget effectively to compete over
time and in the face of an ongoing revolution in many aspects of military affairs, as well as world
trade, manufacturing, and services. A strategy that is not tied to a budget or plans that are constantly
updated to look forward at least 5 to 10 years in terms of spending and resources – and that does
not examine the spending and actions of both our two major competitors and our strategic partners
– is no strategy at all.

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