Russia’s hostile military incursions have brutally exposed Europe’s limited ability to organise its own defence.

The past few weeks have witnessed a significant increase in provocative acts undertaken by the Russian military. Last month saw Russian drones violating Polish and Romanian airspace. This was followed by Nato warplanes intercepting three MiG-31 fighter jets flying over Estonian territory.

Russia has since been blamed for operating the unidentified drones that caused the recent closure of airports in Denmark and Germany, causing massive disruption to commercial air traffic.


Various explanations have been advanced for this upsurge in Russian provocation, from Moscow seeking to test the readiness of Nato’s defensive capabilities on its eastern flank, to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to draw attention away from the failure of his military campaign in Ukraine.

Whatever the truth behind Moscow’s more aggressive attitude towards its European neighbours, it has prompted European leaders to hold emergency talks to consider how best to improve the continent’s defences.


Persuading Europe to take its defence obligations seriously has been a major problem for US President Donald Trump, who has publicly chastised his European allies for their over-reliance on American firepower.

Trump’s enduring dislike of what he regards as European freeloading, which dates back to his first term in the White House, has prompted fears that the defence review currently being undertaken by Elbridge Colby, the US Undersecretary of War, could result in significant reductions of US forces based in Europe. Colby has previously argued persuasively that the US needs to prioritise China over Europe in order to protect its own interests.



To counter the anti-Europe lobby within the Trump administration, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has set out her own plans for boosting Europe’s defences, called Eastern Flank Watch. Von der Leyen is proposing four defence projects that will better protect Europe from future acts of Russian aggression.

This includes creating a “drone wall”, a complex network of detection and interception systems that would prevent Moscow from launching drone and missile attacks against European targets on the scale recently witnessed in Ukraine.

The “drone wall” concept featured prominently when European leaders, including Sir Keir Starmer, gathered in Copenhagen to discuss their response to Russia’s persistent violations of European airspace.

EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, predicted the plan to establish air defences to cover Poland and the Baltics would cost about €1 billion, and that the system could be up and running in less than a year.

But the challenge of persuading European leaders to cooperate on a unified mission should not be underestimated.

Countries such as Poland and the Baltic States, that are located in close proximity to Moscow’s war machine, are understandably keen to endorse a project that will help to safeguard their security. There has been less enthusiasm shown by European leaders who do not have to contend directly with the Russian threat.

Germany and France have raised concerns over feasibility and cost, and how the proposals will be integrated into existing EU and Nato military plans. There are also concerns that Brussels might be exploiting the Russia threat to pursue its long-standing agenda to establish its own defence force to rival Nato, a move that most defence experts believe would fundamentally undermine the transatlantic alliance.

Meanwhile opposition to the proposals from southern EU countries, such as Italy and Greece, is based on concerns that any future EU defence projects should benefit the entire bloc, and not just those countries on Nato’s eastern flank.

This unedifying wrangling between European leaders over how best to improve their defensive arrangements could ultimately prove self-defeating, as it is likely to confirm the Trump administration’s view that Nato’s European member states are constitutionally incapable of protecting their own interests.

Trump has already shown through his interventions on the Ukraine conflict that he believes conflicts taking place in Europe should be resolved by Europeans.

If the Europeans prove incapable of constructing even the most basic defensive measures, such as an anti-drone shield, to protect themselves against Russia, the US leader is unlikely to be willing to come to their rescue in the event of a major escalation in tensions with Moscow.

Divisions among European leaders over how best to defend Nato’s eastern flank will also confirm Putin’s view that it is Nato, and not Russia, that is the “paper tiger” in the confrontation between Russia and the West.

When Trump made his quip about Russia’s military being a “paper tiger” because of its failed offensive in Ukraine, he may not have fully grasped the inadequacies of Nato’s own ability to achieve its own goals.